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Abstract: What justifies one interlocutor to challenge the conversational expectations of the 
other? Paul Grice approaches conversation as one instance of joint action that, like all such 
action, is governed by the Cooperative Principle. He thinks the expectations of the interlocutors 
must align, although he acknowledges that expectations can and do shift in the course of a 
conversation through a process he finds strange. Martin Heidegger analyzes discourse as 
governed by the normativity of care for self and for another. It is the structure of care that 
warrants disrupting the presumed cooperative horizon of a conversation in order to occasion 
some new insight. The chapter expands Heidegger’s ontological conception of care to make 
sense of the exigencies of conversation. Conversation requires taking cognizance of (1) the 
human good, (2) the specifics of the conversational context, and (3) one’s responsibilities for the 
other. This threefold understanding can provide directives for subverting the interlocutor’s 
expectation for the purposes of a given conversation. 
 
 In his Autobiography, Benjamin Franklin lists “silence” as the second of the thirteen 
virtues that he wishes to make his own. He expresses this virtue with the following precept: 
“Speak not but what may benefit others or yourself; avoid trifling conversation” (Franklin 1906: 
86). He explains that he has a penchant for “prattling, punning, and joking,” and he accordingly 
wishes to listen more and to speak less (Franklin 1906: 88). In an earlier chapter, he mentions the 
reason he rarely wished to listen to the only Presbyterian preacher in Philadelphia: because his 
sermons were concerned with confessional rather than ethical matters, Franklin found them 
“very dry, uninteresting, and unedifying” (Franklin 1906: 84). In this way, Franklin counsels us 
to speak to benefit others and thereby avoid the censure of being uninteresting. His musings raise 
the question concerning the logic of conversation. This logic is implicit in the ordinary ways in 
which we evaluate conversational moves, whether those of our own or of others.  
 When we judge that a move in a conversation is interesting, we do not attend to the words 
but the articulation of the world that is so offered; to say that something said is interesting is to 
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say that the person who says it is perceptive and it is therefore worthwhile to see the world from 
the proffered vantage point. To say that something is uninteresting is to say that in this case one 
does not gain much from viewing the world from that person’s point of view; that in this case the 
person is not particularly perceptive or insightful. Conversation aims at having the world 
articulated, highlighted, intensified through the interchange of points of view. 
 The question what we should say if and when we speak is a topic of considerable interest 
today. Paul Grice (1991) introduced the theme into contemporary analytic philosophy by 
clarifying the communicative motives implicit in speech acts. According to his “Cooperative 
Principle,” a conversation ought to unfold according to the implicit expectations of the 
interlocutors, although he calls attention to the puzzling phenomenon in which a conversation 
can profitably shift expectations. Grice’s Cooperative Principle has also spawned contemporary 
speech pragmatics. Sperber and Wilson think conversation, like all communication, is governed 
by the principle of relevance: I think what I have to say is beneficial enough to be worth your 
effort of listening, and I listen to you on the assumption that what you have to say will be 
beneficial enough to me to be worth my effort of listening (Sperber and Wilson 1995: 156-57). 
The Gricean-pragmatist approach raises foundational questions concerning what counts as 
beneficial and so relevant, which trade on questions concerning the nature of the two 
interlocutors. Also pressing is the question concerning what conditions might obtain that would 
justify subverting the expected horizon of a given discourse.  
The puzzling but central character of cooperation and relevance for conversation happens 
upon terrain earlier explored by phenomenological authors, especially Martin Heidegger. 
According to phenomenology, conversation is not in fact a species of joint action whose horizon 
is determined by prior purposes; conversation is instead a joint activity whose end is to share the 
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truth of the world more explicitly (Engelland 2014; McMullin 2013: 174-76; Carman 2003: 238-
41; Taylor 1985: 259). There is therefore the obligation to disrupt the presumed horizon of a 
given conversation if it be possible and advisable to occasion a deeper understanding of the truth 
of things. Even before deciding to cooperate for the purposes of a given conversation, we are 
geared toward one another in care. 
In this chapter, I would like to focus on the logic of conversation and the question of what 
justifies one interlocutor to challenge the conversational expectations of the other. I first turn to 
Grice who approaches conversation as one instance of joint action that, like all such action, is 
governed by the Cooperative Principle. He thinks the expectations of the interlocutors must 
align, although he acknowledges that expectations can and do shift in the course of a 
conversation through a process he finds strange. I then attend to Martin Heidegger’s analysis of 
discourse as governed by the normativity of care for self and for another. It is the structure of 
care that warrants disrupting the presumed cooperative horizon of a conversation in order to 
occasion some new insight. Finally, I expand Heidegger’s ontological conception of care to 
make sense of the exigencies of conversation. In my view, conversation requires taking 
cognizance of (1) the human good, (2) the specifics of the conversational context, and (3) one’s 
responsibilities for the other. This threefold understanding can provide directives for subverting 
the interlocutor’s expectation for the purposes of a given conversation. Care moves us to bear 






1. Grice on Cooperation and Conversation 
Question: “How was the flight?” Reply: “Let’s just say I’ll never fly again.” Here the 
statement, “I’ll never fly again,” does not literally answer the question. It is also false in its literal 
meaning; the speaker has no intention of avoiding air transportation in the future. But it answers 
the question by way of implicature: the flight must have been really bad to motivate a (feigned) 
resolution never to fly again. In order to explain how such implicatures work, Grice needs to 
explain their context, everyday conversation. To do so, he identifies the basic principle present in 
conversation, the Cooperative Principle, which he formulates as follows: “Make your 
conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted 
purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice 1991: 26). He then 
draws from Kant’s categories to articulate four groups of supporting maxims.  
Under the category Quantity, he specifies that a conversation contribution should provide 
neither too much nor too little information. One can here think of a conversation gone awry 
because one of the participants is making personal disclosures out of keeping with the context. 
Under the category Quality, he provides more important guidance. First there is what he calls a 
“supermaxim” that governs conversation: “Try to make your contribution one that is true” (Grice 
1991: 27). Second, he adds two specific maxims: do not utter falsehoods and do not speak 
without sufficient grounds for thinking what you say is true. Truthfulness or veracity anchors 
most types of conversation, although one could imagine an acceptable language game that 
involves telling tall tales; Grice’s point, I take it, is that the purpose of the speaker should match 
the purpose of the hearer; if the hearer expects truth, which the hearer usually does, that’s what 
the speaker should provide. Under the category of Relation, Grice adduces a single maxim, “Be 
relevant.” A conversation can get sidetracked, stalled, or come to grief due to inappropriate 
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conversational contributions. While the first three categories relate to what is said, the fourth 
category, Manner, concerns the how of what is said. The supermaxim he adduces is “Be 
perspicuous” under which he specifies various goals such as clarity, distinctness, brevity, and 
orderliness. One cannot help but think of student papers, the worst of which are not 
conversational contributions because they are obscure, ambiguous, and jumbled. With these four 
categories, Grice provides some content to his Cooperative Principle governing conversation, the 
observance of which makes conversation possible. 
 Grice gives his analysis of the Cooperative Principle as background to making sense of 
implicature in which we mean and can be taken to mean more than what we say. In this 
connection, it is noteworthy that the word “interesting” can carry an implicature. We may be 
asked for our opinion of something we found deeply unsatisfactory but, because it would be 
indelicate of us to say so, we reply, “It was interesting.” We may share with our friends an article 
advocating a controversial point and say we found it “interesting,” which expresses a 
noncommittal attitude that is projected so as to not come across as overbearing. It may seem that 
we offer a measured positive evaluation when in fact we do no such thing. Now, our interlocutor 
will be able to detect such implicatures provided they know us well enough. That we should use 
the vague term “interesting” could appear to undermine the Cooperative Principle; in the 
category Quantity, it provides too little information; in the category of Manner, it is ambiguous; 
in the category of Quality, its ambiguity erodes confidence in truthfulness; and in the category of 
Relation, such a conversational contribution can appear flippant and irrelevant. However, this 
pressure on the Cooperative Principle alerts the thoughtful hearer that the speaker is meaning 
more than what is said. The specific context of the conversation and the background beliefs 
mutually known to hearer and speaker can serve thereby to make the conversational contribution 
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known as a contribution that supplies the right amount of information, is perfectly clear in its 
expression, is truthful, and is relevant. To make sense of this implicature, it might be useful to 
add another maxim under the category of Manner: “Don’t needlessly offend.” This would 
accommodate various submaxims, such as “If you can’t say something nice about it, say it was 
interesting” or “Offer challenging views as suggestive rather than assertive.” For his part, Grice 
gives the example of “Be polite,” noting that there are aesthetic, social, and moral maxims 
outside of the conversational ones he has identified that may lead to implicatures (Grice 1991: 
28). My own sense is that the maxim, “Don’t needlessly offend,” is a requirement of 
conversation rather than an extraneous social maxim; if, as Grice suggests, conversation has as 
its aim mutual illumination of the truthit requires a mutually supportive context which excludes 
unnecessary conflict. 
Grice’s appeal to the logic of conversation also provides some direction for 
understanding what is happening when we use the word “interesting” in a straightforward way 
without any implicature. Something that is interesting is not something particularly associated 
with Quantity, Quality, or Manner—the amount of information, its reliability, or its mode of 
expression —although these are not unrelated to something’s being taken to be interesting. Too 
much or too little information might deaden or fail to enkindle interest in a thing, and fiction can 
sometimes outperform fact in terms of interest. Something that is interesting, however, does 
especially concern the category of Relation and its supermaxim of relevance, which specifies that 
contributions must be appropriate. Grice, for his part, seems to think this category the most 
interesting to think about; its simplicity masks a host of complex issues: 
Though the maxim itself is terse, its formulation conceals a number of problems that 
exercise me a good deal: questions about what different kinds and focuses of relevance 
there may be, how these shift in the course of a talk exchange, how to allow for the fact 
that subjects of conversation are legitimately changed, and so on. I find the treatment of 
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such questions exceedingly difficult, and I hope to revert to them in later work (Grice 
1991: 27). 
 
What makes something interesting and so relevant? How can relevance constrain the horizon of a 
conversation and rupture the horizon of a conversation? How can conversation as cooperative 
behavior presupposing a shared goal come to adopt a new goal in its unfolding? What’s at the 
bottom of relevance that makes it shared and dynamic? 
 John Searle follows Grice in zeroing in on the question of relevance for making sense of 
the logic of conversation. He notes that “a topic must be, as such, an object of interest to the 
speaker and hearer” (Searle 2002: 187). The invocation of interest in turn involves the purpose of 
the interlocutors, a purpose that is not determined by conversation in general and that, in fact, 
may shift in the course of a conversation. Precisely because conversation remains open to 
different purposes Searle cannot render its logic with the same sort of precision he rendered 
speech acts (Searle 2002: 193). Nonetheless, he does proceed to characterize conversation as a 
kind of joint action that calls upon a preintentional background, and it is just this involvement 
with a preintentional background that determines the relevance at work in a conversation (Searle 
2002: 198-199). What I find valuable about his engagement with Grice is the recognition that the 
principle of relevance entails something prior to a specific conversation for its comprehension. 
Referring to this as the background rightly suggests an apriori dimension, although Searle’s 
account of the background is notoriously ambiguous (Dreyfus 1991: 103-105, Ratcliffe 2004). 
What is this background, and how does it explain shifts in relevance? 
 
2. Heidegger on Care and Reticence 
 From Grice, we have a rich account of conversation as a joint action that operates in light 
of a joint commitment to being helpful, truthful, relevant, and clear. This account of conversation 
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gives us resources to understand possible implicatures concerning the word, “interesting.” As 
Grice and Searle note, it also raises important questions about the nature and scope of relevance. 
But it leaves the ordinary plain sense of interesting underdeveloped, and it leaves the background 
of relevance underdetermined. To shed light on this sense of interesting and its context, it is 
helpful to turn to Heidegger, who distinguishes between being interested in something and 
finding it interesting: 
[1] Inter-est [Inter-esse] means to be between and among things, to stand in the 
midst of a thing and to remain near it. [2] But today’s interest accepts as valid only what 
is interesting [Interessante]. And interesting is the sort of thing that can freely be 
regarded as indifferent the next moment, and be displaced by something else, which then 
concerns us just as little as what went before. Today, one often takes the view that one 
especially honors something by finding it interesting. The truth is that such a judgment 
has already relegated the interesting thing to the ranks of what is indifferent [das 
Gleichgültige] and soon boring (WCT/WHD: 5/6-7).1  
 
The etymological sense of interest expresses something of Heidegger’s research into the 
condition for the possibility of intentionality. It fulfills Heidegger’s formulation of care from 
Being and Time: “the being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-being-already-in-(the-world) as 
being-near [Sein-bei] (entities encountered within-the-world)” (BT/SZ: 237/192). This formula 
compactly expresses the interplay of affectivity and spontaneity enabled by timeliness in which 
the manifestation of things is possible. The human is not only thrown open in terms of disposed 
understanding, but in virtue of this being thrown open the human can encounter things in their 
otherness (Engelland 2017: 32-38). And, so encountered, things can show themselves from 
themselves via a phased structure: human beings begin by directing-themselves-toward a topic of 
investigation; then they grow into a dwelling-with that item; on that basis, they can apprehend or 
interpret the item; finally, they can preserve that apprehension as a modification of their original 
directing-themselves-toward the thing (HCT/GA20: 163/219-20). The authentic sense of interest, 
its placing us near a thing, enables us to know the thing in question.  
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Heidegger also mounts a criticism of contemporary talk, namely that it has reduced 
interest to what is interesting. What’s interesting functions like the index finger—it singles out 
but only momentarily; in the next moment it will point out something else. When it comes to 
what is interesting, Heidegger thinks we are all too easily determined by what everyone (das 
Man) thinks, which constitutes the Public (die Offentlichkeit). By reading the newspaper, 
watching television, or reading blog posts we are habituated to a certain interpretation of what 
counts as pleasurable, entertaining, fearful, and shocking: “…we do not say what we see, but 
rather the reverse, we see what everyone says [man … sprichte] about the matter” (HCT/GA20: 
56/75). The Public treats everything as equally important. By consequence, it never attains the 
things that really matter (BT/SZ: 165/127). To reach the thing pointed out, to reach the thing that 
is interesting, requires an authentic devotion, a break from the logic of distraction warding off 
boredom. It requires entering into wonder in order to bring something near and exhibit it as such. 
The word “interesting” is thus ambiguous and slippery. While we appeal to it thinking we have 
fulfilled the authentic sense of being in the midst of something, we all too easily express a 
superficial attitude of fundamental indifference to the topic in question. 
How does Heidegger’s meditation on interest and care illuminate the logic of 
conversation? He roots conversation in the joint openness afforded by care: “Words emerge from 
that essential agreement of human beings with one another, in accordance with which they are 
open in their being with one another for the beings around them, which they can then 
individually agree about—and this also means fail to agree about” (FCM/GA29/30: 309/447). 
Heidegger spends much of his thought unpacking what constitutes this essential agreement, an 
agreement that, among other things, makes conversation possible. “In discourse being-with 
becomes ‘explicitly’ shared; that is to say, it is already, but it is unshared as something that has 
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not been grasped and appropriated” (BT/SZ: 205/162). Like Grice, Heidegger sees conversation 
as a specific possibility of a more general ability. Beyond Grice, he situates the possibility of 
joint action within the transcendental structure of human existence and its shared truth (Crowell 
2013, Golob 2014, Engelland 2015, Engelland 2017). Heidegger thereby grounds the 
Cooperative Principle in care-for or solicitude (Fürsorge). Talking to others about things is a 
matter of letting them see what is pointed out (BT/SZ: 197/155). 
Heidegger observes that solicitude admits of negative and positive modes as well as 
inauthentic and authentic ones. Quite often, we are indifferent to those we encounter, an 
indifference that is deficient in solicitude. But we can show our care for others positively in two 
ways: either by leaping in for them and completing the task in their stead, which creates a 
relation of dependence, or by leaping ahead of them and enabling them to complete the task for 
themselves, a move which frees them to come into their own. Heidegger applies these 
possibilities of solicitude to joint action in a way that is applicable to a conversation. Participants 
may mistrust each other and thereby exercise solicitude in a negative mode, but it is also possible 
for them to exercise an authentic positive mode which frees each to deal with the thing in 
question together:  
When they devote themselves to the same thing [Sache] in common, their doing so is 
determined by the manner in which their Dasein, each in its own way, has been affected. 
They thus become authentically bound together, and this makes possible the right kind of 
objectivity [die rechte Sachlichkeit], which frees the other in his freedom for himself 
(BT/SZ: 159/122). 
 
Heidegger, then, would see Grice’s Cooperative Principle as governing a certain positive and 
indeed authentic possibility of solicitude for others. He does not refrain from using the language 
of maxim to discuss such existential possibilities: “Insofar as it determines the execution of a 
possibility of the very existence of Dasein, a principle is also called a maxim” (HCT/GA20: 
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85/104).2 In this way, to do justice to the logic of conversation, we might follow Heidegger and 
expand the category of Relation to accommodate various modes of community. It would then 
carry certain maxims such as “Care for others,” “Help by enabling (rather than substituting for) 
their freedom,” and the like.  
 Among the possibilities of discourse, Heidegger identifies “discretion” or “reticence” 
(Verschwiegenheit) as an authentic one. Rather than fall prey to idle talk, which talks carelessly 
about something and flits from topic to topic, reticence is prone to silence. In the space of that 
silence it can really listen to another and it can take time to ponder before speaking (BT/SZ 
208/165, 218/174). In this way, reticence makes room for the silent summons of conscience, 
which brings the self thoughtfully back to itself and its openness to the world (BT/SZ 318/273). 
Reticence makes us answerable to others through fostering a readiness to give reasons for our 
decisions (Crowell 2013: 225-227). What Heidegger gives us to understand is that all too easily 
we will keep to what is merely interesting and thereby remain immune to the truth of things. 
Silence, opened up by reticence, holds such talk at bay. In doing so, it allows us to hear the other 
who speaks to us, to become thoughtful about what is, and to be attentive to the quiet call of 
conscience that provokes us to care. In this way, Heidegger’s analyses give us reason to expand 
Grice’s table of maxims still further:  
Quantity: Remember that silence can be richly communicative (BT/SZ: 208/164-65).  
 
Quality: Avoid idle talk by first making the topic one’s own (BT/SZ: 270/169). Making 
the topic one’s own wards off hearsay, gossip, and superficiality.  
 
Relation: Avoid empty curiosity which seeks new experiences for the sake of novelty 
instead of for the sake of achieving understanding (BT/SZ: 216/172). 
 




Grice wonders how the presumed aims of a conversation can be upended in the course of 
a conversation. Heidegger thinks that reticence enables such a transformation. In the “Letter on 
‘Humanism’,” he illustrates this power by recalling the charming story Aristotle relates about 
Heraclitus (Aristotle 1941: 645a17-22). Moved by curiosity, a group of strangers seek out the 
great thinker, Heraclitus, only to be shocked that instead of finding him in meditation or 
disputation they find him silently warming himself by the kitchen stove. Heidegger comments, 
“The vision of a shivering thinker offers little of interest [Interessanten]. At this disappointing 
spectacle even the curious lose their desire to come any closer” (PM/GA9: 270/186). The seekers 
do not really seek; they remain at the level of admiration. Heidegger again comments, “The 
group hopes that in their visit to the thinker they will find things that will provide material for 
entertaining conversation [Gerede]—at least for a while” (PM/GA9: 270/185). Aristotle tells us 
that Heraclitus invites them through the door with the words, “Come in and don’t be afraid, for 
here too the gods are present.” Heraclitus is inviting them to shift from marveling to wonder, 
from a search for the unusual to a recognition of the usualness of the usual. He could have 
chased them off, of course, or let them wander away into the darkness, but he saw the 
opportunity, in the conversation, of challenging them to expand their horizon of inquiry. His 
conversational contribution, the fruit of reticence, expresses his having become the conscience of 
the strangers in such a way that he frees them from superficiality so that they might come into 
their own. As Heidegger writes in Being and Time: 
Dasein’s resoluteness towards itself is what first makes it possible to let the others who 
are with it “be” in their ownmost potentiality-for-being, and to co-disclose this 
potentiality in the solicitude which leaps forth and liberates. When Dasein is resolute, it 
can become the “conscience” of others. Only by authentically being-their-selves in 
resoluteness can people authentically be with one another—not by ambiguous and jealous 
stipulations and talkative fraternizing in the “everyone” and in what “everyone” wants to 




What Heraclitus says to the strangers is relevant to their good but not relevant to their 
preconceptions for what a conversation with the famous thinker would amount to. Heraclitus 
leaps ahead to set them free to care more deeply. In this case, the thinker disrupts Grice’s 
Cooperative Principle by challenging the strangers’ expectation regarding the conversation, but 
the thinker does so in light of a deeper commitment to the demands of solicitude for others, a 
demand that involves helping others be perceptive about what is most important.  
Heidegger takes us further than Grice into the logic of conversation by detailing the 
solicitude and authenticity that can justify changes of relevance. Reticence challenges the 
presumed horizon of idle talk in order to make effective the words that really matter. If we are to 
revise Grice’s Cooperative Principle in light of Heidegger’s care, we might add a new maxim 
from Heraclitus: “Expect the unexpected” (Heraclitus 1979: 129). That is, an agreed aim of 
conversation is to be surprised, even concerning the presumed horizon of that conversation.  
 
3. Filling in the Context of Care 
 Steven Crowell helpfully characterizes the content of conversation as follows: “What it 
means to be a good father, friend, or carpenter—and so also what it means to be a good person, 
morally good—is always the substance of ‘the conversation that we ourselves are’” (Crowell 
2013: 303). Conversation takes its bearings from the concrete context and content of care: that’s 
what we spend our time talking about and that’s what’s involved in navigating shifts in 
relevance. Does Heidegger have the resources for making sense of the vicissitudes of 
conversation in terms of its concrete context and content? 
Suppose a student calls upon a professor during office hours. What determines what the 
professor should and should not say? The student wants to figure out how to get an “A” in the 
14 
 
class so she can get into medical school; the professor wants to alert her to the issue of truth and 
wisdom. Yes, by all means, the professor should exercise care, but in what way? Here one is 
mindful of Sartre’s critique of Kantian ethics as being too formal (Sartre 1993: 47). Yes, do not 
use another as a means to an end, but how might one decide what to do here and now? The 
alternative, pace Sartre, is not some sort of decisionism. Rather it is a matter of a prudential 
mindfulness of the specific contours of the situation, contours sketched but not fully outlined by 
Heidegger: “…when the call of conscience summons us to our potentiality-for-being, it does not 
hold before us some empty ideal of existence, but calls us forth into the situation” (BT/SZ 
347/300). I would like to follow Heidegger and work out care in terms of its threefold context: 
the good to be expressed, the possibility for conversation here and now, and the inherited 
identities for speakers available for repetition and correction (BT/SZ 437/385). In this way, I 
recall and exceed Heidegger’s temporal analysis as filling in the context of conversation in order 
to render intelligible disruptions in conversational expectations concerning content. 
 
1. Futural: Wonder and the Human Good 
While appropriating the theme of care from the Augustinian tradition via Scheler, 
Heidegger jettisons what he regards as a neo-Platonic overlay in both Scheler and Augustine 
(PRL/GA60: 199/265). The ordo amoris or order of love specifies not descriptively how one 
loves but prescriptively how one ought to love if one is to love well. Heidegger wishes to reduce 
the tiered sense of goods to the basic opposition of authenticity and inauthenticity. In terms of 
enacting fundamental ontology the opposition is perhaps sufficient; but in terms of making sense 
of the human good it is not. What disappears in this way is the good’s complexity, which 
involves not only perspicacious self-awareness but also various grades of apprehended goods. 
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Scheler observes that there are idolatrous, inverted, and inadequate loves (Scheler 1973: 124). A 
student might want lots of money as if that were the highest good; he might want grades instead 
of learning; he might have an insufficient appreciation for the goods of the intellect. Or again a 
father might wish to be eminently successful in his career even if that means being woefully 
deficient in his fatherhood. Part of what we should talk about, as Crowell observes, is the 
question concerning what we should care about. For such a conversation to be worthwhile, the 
interlocutors must assume there is a difference between how one in fact loves and how one does 
well to love. That difference provides an important justification for exceeding the presumed 
horizon of relevance in a given conversation. 
In challenging that horizon, an interlocutor does not seek to impose an external constraint 
but to elicit inward recognition of what, in truth, care should be about. The normativity can be 
found within each of us but the truth of the goods must come to light for them to be appreciated 
rightly. Instead of the careless indifference of boredom’s interesting, which levels all differences, 
one appeals to the careful difference of wonder’s authentic interest, which prioritizes more 
important topics. Curiosity and boredom rest content in superficial sameness; wonder and awe 
open up the stratification of goods. In truth, the student not only cares about money and the 
father not only about his career; there is a still deeper, if uncultivated, interest that must be 
awakened via wonder. Care naturally cares, but the truth of the grades of goods must be made 
plain so that we might care about the right things. 
A sense of the various ingredients in the complete human good provides essential 
direction for determining conversation’s content. The professor invites the student to find the 
contemplative character of human life—a responsibility for the truth of things operative in every 
mode of human life thoughtfully lived out—but part of this thoughtfulness involves recognizing 
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the importance of money for rightly caring for oneself and one’s loved ones. Similarly, a friend 
might suggest to the professor that success in his career, which is a laudable goal, is secondary to 
success in raising his children. Both are goods but they are not equally important, and confusion 
on this point will prove blameworthy. Heidegger is right of course that there is no table of goods 
that can simply be intuited, but the stratification of goods can arise in experience due to 
differences in fulfillment (Engelland 2004). Precisely because of our finitude we can only pursue 
one good at a time and can therefore not pursue all goods at once. Finitude requires 
prioritization, requires serially choosing from among competing goods in order thereby over time 
to bring about the variegated human good. Just what constitutes the human good is, as Crowell 
suggests above, central to the human conversation, and it is more complicated than Heidegger 
realizes (Engelland 2017: 228-234). 
 
2. Moment of Vision: What Is Appropriate in This Situation  
Insight into the human good is not sufficient to warrant subverting the presumed aim of 
any and every conversation. Consider a Saturday morning conversation over the breakfast table. 
“What are we going to do today?” “Pursue the good and avoid the bad.” Or, even if that 
conversational move is welcome it is only as a humorous statement of the obvious that will then 
call for a reissue of the question: “Are you heading to the store? Is there another birthday party 
this weekend?” Conversation involves not only a sense of the human good but also a sense for 
the moment, what is possible and relevant in this context, that trumps absolute considerations of 
the good. The reason for this is that we do need to attend to lesser goods in order to share life 
with others and only specific goods can be achieved via action.  
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The understanding of the human good is being offered to others as their own. Hence they 
must be induced to see it. Introducing it outside the appropriate moment will only serve to 
harden them to its allure. For a shift in relevance requires a previously established rapport, trust, 
and openness. Consider sitting on an airplane: one’s inflight neighbor might be buried in a book 
or engrossed in a movie in such a way that he or she would tolerate a request to move so that one 
can go to the bathroom but would not regard that exchange as an opening for questions 
concerning the nature of the travel, the content of the book or movie, or one’s life ambitions. 
Rapport relaxes and makes others available to conversational turns and surprises: it makes 
solicitude something that is felt. On the basis of the established rapport of solicitude, and given 
the specifics of the situation including the perceived mood of the moment, a shift in relevance 
becomes possible.  
In this way, one must attend to what can and cannot be accomplished given the specific 
historical horizons of the conversation that are in play in the present moment (BT/SZ 345-
48/298-300). As Heidegger points out, authentic resolve sizes up the situation in its peculiar 
juxtaposition of elements and realizes just what it is for. The question of what possibility this 
specific moment with its peculiar complex of factors might afford proves essential.  
 
3. Having-Been: One’s Responsibility Given One’s Inherited Role Relative to This Person 
What care calls for depends on the roles at play for the people in the situation. Yes, one 
has an obligation to everyone one meets, everyone who thanks to proximity is a neighbor, but 
more robust obligations come in being a spouse, a parent, a child, a friend, a teacher, a judge, a 
doctor, a mechanic, etc.. Crowell appeals to Christine Korsgaard’s “practical identity” as 
determining reasons for acting as we do, as filling in the content of care (Crowell 2013: 290-91; 
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Korsgaard 1996: 100-102). A professor has reasons to mentor her students, doctors have reasons 
to care for their patients, a mother has reasons to parent her children, a friend has reasons to care 
for a friend, and so on.3 To value these identities is to have obligations to do certain actions. To 
be able to defend one’s conversational choices, to answer the question, “Why did you say that?” 
(a question rarely verbalized but frequently expressed in a dumbfounded countenance), requires 
not only appealing to care but also what care requires for a father or mother, friend or neighbor, 
in just this situation. The roles specify arcs of solicitude that shape our understanding of our 
responsibility for disrupting suppositions about conversational purpose.  
Practical identities help fill in Heidegger’s invocation of the repetition of possibilities into 
which we are thrown (BT/SZ 437/385). We inherit an understanding of what these roles specify 
and in repeating these identities we simultaneously make them available to others. A professor, 
for example, not only aspires to be a good professor; in doing so she aspires to be memorable 
and formative so that any students who later assume the role will do so at least in part in light of 
the understanding of the role as shaped by their teacher’s exercise of her practical identity. 
Similarly, what it means to be a parent is at least in part informed by our experience of 
parenthood and by the sorts of expectations our culture has regarding these roles. We say the 
sorts of things that a father or mother should say rather than the sorts of things that a friend, 
teacher, or doctor should say. Never do we strive to do simply what has been done; rather we 
strive to do what should be done taking inspiration from what has been done but never aping it 
except thoughtlessly. Thus these practical identities are always made our own as we select out 
what is exemplary from what is not. We strive to emulate the intervention of an inspiring teacher 
or parent rather than the talk of an incompetent teacher or parent. 
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Consider Heraclitus’s visitors trekking to see the philosopher or the student frequenting a 
professor’s office hours: here the philosopher or professor has a rich practical identity that 
specifies obligations towards the visitors or students. In particular, just to be a philosopher (or to 
a lesser extent, a philosophy professor) means to be obliged to risk unwelcome disruptions of the 
expectations of one’s conversational interlocutors for the sake of their good, to bear witness to a 
higher good than the one presumed as the topic of the conversation. That indeed is a great part of 
what it means to be a philosopher, to resolve to be a gadfly, a conscience in the first place for 
oneself but also for others. After all, if the philosopher does not bear witness to the priority of 
wisdom, who on earth will? Heidegger recalls Aristotle’s recollection of Heraclitus, but we 
might also attend to an even more famous episode of philosophical exchange. Socrates, on his 
deathbed, makes his last conversational contribution as follows: “Don’t be careless” (Madison 
2002). By bidding his disciples to take care, he recalls his central teaching as summarized in the 
Apology: “… are you not ashamed of your eagerness to possess as much wealth, reputation and 
honors as possible, while you do not care for nor give thought to wisdom or truth, or the best 
possible state of your soul?” (Plato 1997: 29d-e). Socrates’s obligation as a gadfly is to enjoin his 
fellow citizens to care for wisdom, truth, and virtue rather than money or honor. The substance 
of what the philosopher should say is to take care; to bear the practical identity of a philosopher 
is to have reason to look to disrupt conversational expectations by enjoining interlocutors to 
attend to the truth of things. In doing so, philosophers might not make the most convivial of 
interlocutors. In the context of a conversation with a philosopher, one should expect to be 
challenged; one should expect shifts in relevance. Of course, there are other practical identities—
doctor, carpenter, neighbor, citizen, and so on—that might oblige us to handle relevance with a 
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lighter touch. The art of conversation involves harmonizing and prioritizing one’s practical 
identities in order to achieve insight into the requisite good of this particular conversation.  
 
Conclusion 
Benjamin Franklin counsels us that conversation ought to be beneficial and that we 
should accordingly avoid prattling on and speaking trifles. Pragmatics valuably recognizes that a 
given speech act calls upon an interpersonal context for its proper interpretation. The principle of 
relevance from pragmatics holds that I think the benefit of what I have to tell you will outweigh 
the trouble of your having to listen to what I say. This approach wrongly suggests a framework 
in which we are silent unless compelled to speak. Human beings, however, naturally talk just as 
naturally as they share the world with one another. Heidegger writes, “We are continually 
speaking in one way or another. We speak because speaking is natural to us. It does not first arise 
out of some special volition” (PLT/US: 189/11). The relation to the interlocutor is not 
established by a particular exchange; rather the exchange comes later, after a relationship has 
already been established by proximity. A conversation, moreover, need not inform in order to 
still achieve some good. To speak to someone means that that person is worth speaking to; the 
act as such embodies care and fortifies the interpersonal relationship even if the content is 
uninformative. Precisely because talking is the default, silence can be communicative; it alerts 
the puzzled interlocutors to the weight of speech by inviting them to pause and consider what 
really is worth saying, what really will benefit oneself and others. It thereby disrupts the hold that 
ordinary ruts of conversation has on us and enables us to plow new furrows. 
 When should we challenge the expected horizons of a conversation? The Grice-Searle 
worry about shifts in relevance receives clarification from Heidegger’s appeal to care and 
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solicitude as the background of conversation. Authenticity enables us to achieve insight into the 
good for ourselves and for others, although the content of this good is more complex than 
Heidegger realizes. Some practical identities involve becoming a conscience for others. A 
mother, father, or friend has an obligation to elevate conversation to focus on higher human 
goods. A philosopher or other leader has the obligation to counsel others to take care. Other 
practical identities direct us to be less robust in our challenge to conversational expectations. The 
human good, the specific dynamics of this situation, and the obligations and possibilities 
specified by one’s own role help fill in the specific content of care. Relevance takes its bearings 
from a solicitude constrained but also liberated by the context: constrained insofar as it makes 
certain conversational contributions out of bounds; liberated insofar as it makes certain 
conversational contributions needful and appropriate—that is, it frees us to be meaningful. What 
should we say when we speak carefully? That depends on our sense of the good, of this moment, 
and of the manner of our responsibility for the other. In this way, Heidegger’s reticence, like 
Franklin’s silence, frees us up to converse about things of genuine interest rather than things that 
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1 For quotations of Heidegger, the first page number refers to the English and the second 
to the German edition: E/G. I have frequently modified the translations in view of uniformity and 
clarity. 
2 Heidegger has in mind the phenomenological “return to the things themselves” as the 
cardinal maxim. 
3 Such roles hearken back to Plato’s rejoinder to Thrasymachus’s voluntarism: to be a 
ruler is to have a practical identity determined by the good of the ruled. Korsgaard specifically 
mentions the disintegration of the tyrant’s identity in Republic IX (Korsgaard 1996: 102). 
